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PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF 
LIABILITY REGIMES FOR INJURIES 
CAUSED BY PERSONS WITH ALZHEIMER'S 
DISEASE 
Edward P. Richards* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
People in the United States and the developed world are living 
longer than ever before. While gains in the average life expectancy 
have been modest, these gains greatly underestimate the growth of 
the elderly population. 1 Most of this elderly population is healthier 
and more active in everyday life than people of comparable age in 
decades past. The amelioration of many of the diseases of age has 
accentuated the problems of the chronic diseases for which there are 
no effective treatments. Perhaps the most devastating of these is 
Alzheimer's disease, a progressive dementia leading to incapacity 
and death. 2 As discussed in the other articles in this symposium, 
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., University of Houston Law Center; M.P.H., University of 
Texas School of Public Health; Professor of Law, University of Missouri Kansas City School 
of Law; Director, Center for Public Health Law-http:/lplague.law.umkc.edu. The author 
wishes to thank Professor Nancy Levit for her review and comments on the draft of the article 
and Associate Library Director Larey Maclachlin and Graduate Fellow Hudson Luce for their 
research assistance. 
1 Average life expectancy is strongly influenced by deaths of the young. Substantial 
increases in the survival rates of persons over the age of the average life expectancy raise the 
average life expectancy itself relatively little. More generally, mortality measures provide 
only a limited view of the health of a population. For a more detailed discussion of the 
problems related 00 mortality measures, see SUMMARIZING POPULATION HEALTH: DIRECTIONS 
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF POPULATIONS METRICS (Marilyn J. Field & 
Marthe R. Gold eds., 1998). 
1 &e Richard Mayeux & Mary Sano, Drug Therapy: Treatment of Alzheimer's Disease, 
341 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1670, 1670 (1999): 
Alzheimer's disease, which is characterued by progresaive loss of memory 
and cognitive function, affects 15 million people worldwide. The incidence 
increases steadily from 0.5 percent per year at the age of 65 years to 
nearly 8 percent per year after the age of 85 years. Because survival for 
a decade is common the prevalence increases from 3 percent at the age of 
65 years to 4 7 percent after the age of 85 years. 
These numbers must be increased by the cases of non-Alzheimer's dementias, which pose the 
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Alzheimer's disease raises significant legal issues because it 
challenges our model of a world neatly divided into autonomous 
citizens and persons legally adjudged incompetent and under the 
control of duly-appointed legal representatives in secure facilities. 
This article discusses the public policy implications of tort 
liability rules for persons with Alzheimer's disease (PWD3) who 
injure their caregivers or members of the general public, and the 
potential liability of their caregivers for not preventing injuries to 
the general public. The analysis is rooted in preventive law and 
therapeutic jurisprudence concerns, 4 rather than advocacy for either 
PWDs or their victims. The objective is to identify the proper 
balance between tort liability, immunity, and non-tort approaches 
such as public health reporting and management strategies. This 
article recognizes that expanding liability will increase the pressure 
on insurers5 and families6 to limit the freedom of PWDs, w bile limits 
on liability may leave deserving persons uncompensated and create 
a public backlash that will result in unnecessarily broad or harsh 
restrictions of PWDs. Most troubling are the perverse incentives 
created by the tort doctrine of duty. For example, because tort law 
requires that once a duty is assumed, it must be carried out non­
negligently: family caregivers who have no legal duty to prevent 
aame legal iaauea. See Clive Ballard et al., Non-Alzheimer Dementias, 13 CURRENT OPINION 
PsYCHIATRY 409 (2000); Howard A Crystal et al., The Relative Frequency of "Dementia of 
Unknown Etiology• Increases with Age and Is Nearly 50% in Nonagenarians, 157 ARCHIVES 
NEUROLOGY 713 (2000). 
1 Aa diacuaaed infra, this includes Alzheimer's disease and dementia secondary to other 
common medical conditions such as HIV infection strokes and non-specific senile dementia. . . . ' See DaVld B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THERAPEtmC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 
CAL. W. L. REv. 115 (1997); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
From Theory to Practice, 68 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 691 (1999). 
1 Aa an example, aaaume a jury awards punitive damages against a PWD who injured 
someone in an automobile accident because the jury believes that it is gross negligence for a 
�non with Alzheimer's diSeaae to drive an automobile. This will put pressure on automobile 
1n�urer1 to deny coverage for PWDs or to price policies beyond the reach of most PWD 
drivers. 
. . '. �� that hold that institutional caregivers can sue the institutionalized PWD for lllJunes inflicted on the caregiver will prompt the institution and the family to demand 
restrictions on the PWD. Holding families liable for the torts of PWDs they are caring for 
may encourage the families to unnecessarily limit the PWD's liberty and could force early 
PWDa into institutional care prematurely. 
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PWDs under their care from driving may become liable for trying to 
stop them without succeeding. 7 
This article is meant to serve as a guide to the study of tort issues 
created by Alzheimer's disease, and is not a definitive recipe for 
solving those problems. It reviews the history of the applicable 
doctrines and the current trends, but recognizes that jurisdictions 
vary widely and that it is uncertain which approach, if any in 
current use, is the best. The author proposes modifying the tort law 
regime with public health and preventive law strategies. Most 
importantly, the author wants to encourage further study of these 
problem, as ·well as the collection and analysis of empirical informa­
tion on the impact of tort law on the lives of PWDs, their caregivers, 
and the people they interact with in society. 
II. PATHOPHYSIOLOGY OF ALzHEIMER'S DISEASE 
While Alzheimer's disease has been known for nearly 100 years, 
until recently it was seen as a disease characterized by significant 
mental impairment in patients for whom no other specific cause 
could be found. 8 The diagnosis was not made until the PWD was so 
incapacitated that it was obvious to all, except perhaps the affected 
person, 9 that he or she was too impaired to engage in activities that 
could endanger others. Outside of injuries to caregivers, the 
Id. 
7 REs'l'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § S24A (1965). 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services 
to another which he should recogni7.e u neceuary for the protection of a 
third person o r  his things, ia subject to liability to the third person for 
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reuonable care to 
protect his undertakings, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increuea the risk of such harm, 
or 
(b) be has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third 
person, or 
(c) the harm ia suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking. 
' While there are specific pathologic signs of Alzheimer's disease in the brain, in the past 
theae could only be determined by an autopsy. 
• The afrected person may never become aware of the diseaae because it ia self-muking: 
it often impairs precisely the higher mental functions that are neceuary to be self-aware that 
one ia becoming impaired. See Mayeux & Sano, supra note 2, at 1670 (stating definite cases 
of Alzheimer's are only confirmed post-mortem). 
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Alzheimer's disease patient did not pose significant risks to the 
public because they were too impaired to drive or engage in other 
risky behavior. In this period, a blanket rule that all persons 
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease would lose their driver's license 
would not have been controversial because Alzheimer's disease was 
not diagnosed until the patient was clearly too incapacitated to 
drive. 
The legal status of dementia is changing, however, as diagnostic 
tests are developed that allow Alzheimer's disease to be diagnosed 
long before it affects behavior, and as it is recognized that dementia 
is an important symptom of other diseases, 10 such as HIV 
infection.11 Now Alzheimer's disease can be diagnosed well before 
it im- pairs the ability to drive or has other affects on gross behav­
ior. New tests, including genetic testing, 12 may allow diagnosis 
years or decades before the first symptomatic manifestations of the 
disease.13 Once diagnosed, the current view is that the decline to 
total incapacity is inevitable and is usually averted only through 
death due to concomitant illness, 14 but the course is highly variable, 
10 Ballard et al., supra note 2. 
11 Thia article will use HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) infection rather the term 
AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome), which is only a symptom complex of some 
persona infected with the lflV virus. This distinction is important because dementia is often 
the first manifestation oflilV infection in persons who otherwise do not have the symptoms 
that trigger the diagnoais of AIDS. Until the definition of AIDS was revised to include 
dementia, it was common for individuals to have disabling HIV dementia without meeting 
the definition fur AIDS. 11 See, e.g., Kaj ab Blennow & Ingmar C. Skoog, Genetic Testing for Alzheimer's Disease: 
How Close is Reality?, 12 PSYCIUATRY 487 (1999); Jean Francois Dartigues & Luc Letenneur, 
Genetic Epidemiology of Alzheimer's Disease, 13 NEUROLOGY 385 (2000); M.B. Liddell et al., 
Genetic Risk of Alzheimer's Disease: Advising Relatives, 178 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 7 (2001). 18 Ingmar Skoog, Detection of Preclinical Alzheimer's Disease, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 502 
(2000). Aa diagnostic tests shift from measures of behavior to biochemical and genetic 
markers, it is expected that many people diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease will live for 
years without impairment, dying of other conditions without ever showing symptoms of 
Alzheimer's disease. This is already reflected in autopsy data that shows that significantly 
more people have the characteristic lesions of Alzheimer's disease in their brains than were 
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease at the time of death. 14 There are findings characteristic of Alzheimer's disease in the brains of many people 
w�o die before developing overt symptoms. The recent extension of the diagnosis to persons 
with few or no overt symptoms raises the possibility that some persons who are diagnosed 
with Alzheimer's disease before any clinical signs develop may have an arrested clinical 
course and not develop the characteristics of Alzheimer's disease. Until there has been 
sufficie!1t time to observe the course of the disease in these persons, it is impossible to 
determine whether those persons with brain pathology consistent with Alzheimer's disease, 
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with some patients declining very quickly and others over a 
substantial number of years. Despite the significant risks posed by 
drivers with symptomatic Alzheimer's disease, 15 it would be difficult 
to justify blanket rules that prohibit all persons diagnosed with 
Alzheimer's disease from driving because such rules would improp­
erly limit the lives of a large number of persons who do not yet pose 
any threat to others.16 
There is an established jurisprudence and regulatory structure 
for insanity, which courts use as precedent when analyzing cases 
involving Alzheimer's disease. Much of the legal analysis of mental 
impairment is p erformed in the criminal context and involves 
specific mental illnesses such as paranoid schizophrenia that have 
characteristic psychology profiles and behavior patterns, or 
conditions such as pedophilia which, by their nature, involve 
violations of the law. The thesis of this paper is that Alzheimer's 
disease differs from traditional legal notions of insanity in several 
key ways that undermine the rigid application of this precedent to 
PWDs. These characteristics are rooted in the pathophysiology of 
the disease, and while none are exclusive to Alzheimer's disease, 17 
but who were asymptomatic, would have developed symptoms had they just lived longer. 
18 Richard M. Dubinsky et al., Practice Parameter: Risk of Driving and AlzMimer's 
Disease (An Evidence·Based Review): Report of the Quality Standards Subcommitt ee of the 
American Academy of Neurology, 64 NEUROLOGY 2205, 2209·10 (2000); Gillian K Fox et al., 
Alzheimer's Disease and Driving: Prediction and Assessment of Driving Performance, 45 J. 
AM. GERIATRIC Soe'Y 949 (1997). 
18 In most cities, and almost all rural areas, being able to drive an automobile is essential 
for the basic tasks of life, including working and shopping for food and household goods. 
There is no adequate alternative transportation; therefore, depriving individuals of their 
driver's licenses can effectively impri8on them in their homes. The social cost of providing 
alternative transportation and support fur such persons would make any such scheme 
politically impoaaible, without regard to its constitutional questionability. For a discussion 
of the limited impact of early Alzheimer's disease on driving, see Jonathan D. Trobe et al., 
Crashes and Violations Among Drivers with Alzheimer Disease, 53 .ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 411 
(1996). 
17 Another common cause of dementia is lilV infection, which has a direct detrimental 
effect on the brain of many infected persons: 
Approximately one third of adults and half of children with the acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) eventually have neurologic complica­
tions, which are directly attributable to infection of the brain by the 
human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV·l). Neurologic problems 
occur even in the absence of opportunistic infection or secondary cancer. 
Important clinical manifestations include impaired mental concentration, 
slowness of hand movements, and difficulty in walking. This malady has 
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a unique combination of these factors are associated with the 
disease. 
Demographics: The prevalence of Alzheimer's disease is already 
much greater than any other equally incapacitating mental disease, 
and it will increase dramatically with the aging of the population. 
This will inevitably lead to more accidents and intentional injuries 
related to dementia and heightened public pressure to compensate 
the injured and restrict the liberty of those with dementia. 
Progression: Alzheimer's disease is progressive in all cases and 
results in complete incapacitation and death, given enough time.18 
Legal rules must reflect this dynamic process, whereas existing 
insanity precedent and competence jurisprudence is binary-the 
person is either fully legally competent or incompetent. As a 
jurisprudential matter, most of the law on insanity and mental 
incapacity is derived from the criminal law, which does not prose­
cute either persons who are incapable of participating in their 
defense or are dead. In contrast, tort law claims proceed without 
regard to the defendant's capacity or presence, merely substituting 
a legal representative when the defendant dies or becomes incompe­
tent.19 As a result, tort defendants who might have been competent 
at the time of the accident might not be competent at trial or even 
during discovery, and will be unable to assist in their defense. 
Unstructured Care: The vast majority of Alzheimer's disease 
patients are cared for by family members, entering nursing homes, 
and other supervised care settings only when the disease is far 
advanced. Most PWDs do not have systematic evaluations of mental 
function to inform them and their caregivers of any necessary 
restrictions on their activities. These caregivers are under signifi-
been called the AIDS dementia complex by Price and colleagues; a more 
recent term is HIV·l-8880Ciated cognitive-motor complex. 
Stuart A Lipton & Howard E. Gendelman, Dementia Associated with the Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 934, 934 (1995). See also David B. 
Clift'ord, Human Immunodeficiency Virus-Associated Dementia, 57 ARCHIVE.S NEUROLOGY 
321 (2000); Roger Higgs & Anthony J. Pinching, Frontiers in Care: A Case of Compulsory 
Treatment in Aids Dementia. Case Study and Commentaries, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 61 (2000). 18 This inevitable progression is based on current knowledge. AB advancements are 
made, allowing the diagnosis to be made earlier, it is po88ible that there will be a group of 
persons who have Alzheimer's disease who never manifest significant impairment and who 
were invisible in the past when diagnosis depended on substantial progreyion of the disease. 
19 Stinson v. Holder, 996 P.2d 1238 (Alaska 2000). 
2001] PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 627 
cant stress from the twenty-four-hour care necessary for PWDs. 
They receive little community support and often are struggling 
financially and poorly educated. These unfortunate circumstances 
make it especially difficult for caregivers to assure that PWDs 
receive proper care and medical evaluation, and limit caregivers' 
ability to prevent PWDs from posing risks to others. 
III. TORT LIABILITY DOCTRINES AND ALzHEIMER'S DISEASE 
A. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 
The criminal law developed a jurisprudence of culpability based 
on degrees of mental capacity very early in its evolution. 20 Since tort 
law evolved from writs of trespass, which did not require proof of 
motive to find liability, tort cases did not delve into the nuances of 
mental impairment, and instead used terms such as generic lunacy, 
idiocy, or insanity. 21 If the defendant injured the plaintiff intention­
ally or negligently, the defendant would be liable unless it could be 
proved that the injury was either privileged or unpreventable. The 
20 Legally, distinctions were made between those that were regarded as "natural" or 
"born fools" and those that were lunatics. It was believed, and for many years argued, that 
if one were a born fool or a child fool he or she could not be judged a criminal. The Selden 
Society's THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES, stated the distinction as follows: 
[T]hen as to fools let us distinguish, for all fools can be adjudged homicides 
except natural fools and children within the age of seven years; for there 
can be no crime or sin without a corrupt will, and there can be no 
corruption of will where there is no discretion and an innocent conscience, 
save in the case of the raging fools. And therefore Robert Walerand 
ordained that heirs who were born fools should be in wars to the king, to 
be married along with their inheritances, of whatsoever fees those 
inheritances might be held. As to madmen we must distinguish, for those 
who are frantic or lunatic can sin feloniously, and thus may sometimes be 
accountable and adjudged as homicides; but not those who are continu· 
ously mad. 
SELDEN SOcIETY, 7 THE MIRROR OF JUSTIC� 138·39 (1896) (footnote omitted). 
21 The Selden Society Year Books contain a decision from The Michelmas Term of King 
Edward II (1309) in which The Honorable C.J. Bereford distinguished between what was 
known as a "born fool" and a lunatic. The born fool was someone who had quite literally been 
born mentally incapacitated. The lunatic, however, was a person who bad at one time been 
sane and later become m ad, continuously furious or mentally incapacitated in some way. See 
SELDEN SOCIETY, 19 SELDEN SOCIETY YEAR BOOK HH (1904) ("[N]ote that if an infant under 
age is a born fool, the King shall have a wardship all his liCe; but it is not so in the case of a 
lunatic."). 
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classic statement of this theory is Weaver v. Ward,22 a case in which 
a soldier was injured by a fellow soldier. The court found that there 
would be liability unless the defendant could show that the injury 
arose from a formal military action or exercise.23 The plaintiff was 
not required to prove any intent to harm, nor was defendant's state 
of mind allowed as a defense. 24 As part of the dicta in the case, the 
court found: "If a lunatick [sic] hurt a man, he shall be answerable 
. t "26 m respass .... 
This early distinction between the role of intent in civil and 
criminal law continued, with most common law courts accepting 
that the mentally impaired are responsible for their torts.26 The 
22 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616). 
23 Id. at 284. Weaver v. Ward is also cited as an early statement of the doctrine that 
soldiers cannot sue the government or fellow soldiers. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 
135, 140 (1950). 
24 Id. One of the earliest cases to adopt and modify Weaver v. Ward to law in the United 
States was Taylor v. Rainbow, 12 Va. (2 Hen & M.) 423 (1808). The Taylor court discussed 
the case in terms of negligence, but followed the English court in not finding any acceptable 
defenses except for matters entirely beyond the control of the defendant. Id. at 442. 
211 Id. This was not at issue in the case and was only used to illustrate that while tort law 
did not depend on the defendant's state of mind, criminal law did and would excuse the 
actions of a lunatic who did have the ability to act with the necessary intent for a crime. 
Grant H. Morris, Requiring Sound Judgments of Unsound Minds: Tort Liability and the 
Limits of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 47 SMU L. REV. 1837, 1839 (1994). 
• During the same period, civil law jurisdictions did exempt insane persons from tort 
liability in many circumstances: 
The curator ad hoc for the defendant based his legal position on the theory 
that, under the civil law as applied in Louisiana, an insane person is not 
liable for his tortious acts because, under the Roman, Spanish, and French 
jurisprudence, and in a number of countries where the principles of civil 
law are recognized, such injury falls within the category of damnum 
absque injuria, and that, while the language of article 2315, R.C.C .. may 
appear to be all·embracing in its scope, it is nevertheless an adoption of 
the concept founded upon the old Spanish laws as applied in Louisiana 
prior to the adoption of the Code of 1825; that the language of the article 
had acquired a definite and established meaning which recognized an 
exception or exemption from liability in favor of insane persons, and, 
therefore, the provisions of the article shovld receive an interpretation 
and construction consistent with the theory of law which prevailed in 
Louisiana at the time of its adoption and which would cause it to be 
harmonized with the general theory of the civil law as recognized in the 
countries where its principles control. 
Yancey v. Maestri, 1�5 So. 509, 510 (La. Ct. App. 1934). Since it was unnecessary to resolve 
the liability of the insane in this case, the court did not decide whether this was an accurate 
statement of Louisiana law. This has not been addressed by subsequent courts but related 
decisions indicate that Louisiana probably follows the common law rule. Se� Johnson v. 
2001) PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 629 
courts also found that the mentally impaired were responsible for 
their actions when they constituted contributory negligence, thus 
preventing the mentally impaired from suing for injuries to 
themselves when their incapacity put them in harm's way.27 There 
are very few reported cases where the incapacity of the plaintiff or 
defendant is critical to the resolution of the case, so it is difficult to 
determine whether this was a significant legal doctrine or one that 
was oft cited but seldom applied. It would be expected that most 
persons so significantly impaired as to trigger the issue would not 
have adequate assets to make litigation attractive. If the defendant 
had assets, they were probably under the control of a guardian or 
the court,28 which complicated a recovery.29 
With the evolution of negligence theory came defenses such as 
standard of care and reasonable behavior.30 While these do not 
Pendleton, 7151 So.2d 332, 331S (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Kirby, J., dissenting). 
27 For an early discussion of this, see Hartfield v. Roper, 21Wend.611S, 619-20, 34 Am. 
Dec. 273, 275-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839). 
28 One court said: 
If a person has either a legal or equitable claim against the estate of an 
idiot, lunatic or habitual drunkard, in the hands of a committee appointed 
by the court of chancery, which such committee refuses to pay, he must 
apply to this court by petition, for payment of his demand; and he will not 
be permitted to obtain payment by means of a suit at law, unless such suit 
is brought with the sanction of this court. 
In re Heller, 3 N.Y. Ch. Ann. lllS (N.Y. Ch. 1832). Interestingly, chronic drunkenness would 
also trigger the protection of the court. See In re Hoag, 4 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 169 (N.Y. Ch. 1838). 
29 Some courts also limited the damages against mentally impaired defendants, 
espousing surprisingly realistic views of tort damages: 
Ordinarily, in an action for a personal injury, the amount of damages is, 
at least to a considerable extent, governed by the motive which influenced 
the party in committing the act. Thus it is usual, and as proper as it is 
usual, for the court, upon the trial of an action for an assault and battery, 
to instruct the jury that the action is maintainable even though the injury 
was accidental; that if intentional, yet when the act is done under the 
excitement of strong provocation, it is a proper ground for the mitigation 
of damages. And, on the contrary, that when the act is committed 
deliberately or maliciously, it is good ground for increasing damages. In 
short, in such cases, the damages are graduated by the intent of the party 
committing the injury. But in respect to the lunatic, as he has properly 
no will, it follows that the only proper measure of damages in an action 
against him for a wrong, is the mere compensation of the party injured. 
Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647, 61SO (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848). 
30 For the purpose of this discussion, the political issues underlying the evolution of tort 
liability, such as the rise of industrialization, are not relevant. For a discussion of this 
evolution, see generally RobertJ. Kacmrowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth· 
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depend on the actor's state of mind, they do depend on the state of 
the actor's mind: the mentally impaired will frequently be unable 
to know or carry out the appropriate standard of care, nor will they 
be able to behave reasonably in many situations. The law, however, 
makes few allowances for the mentally impaired. The classic 
statement of this doctrine is by Holmes, in this book, THE COMMON 
LAW: 
The standards of the law are standards of general 
application. The law takes no account of the infinite 
. varieties of temperament, intellect, and education 
which make the internal character of a given act so 
different in different men. It does not attempt to see 
men as God sees them, for more than one sufficient 
reason. In the first place, the impossibility of nicely 
measuring a man's powers and limitations is far 
clearer than that of ascertaining his knowledge of 
law, which has been thought to account for what is 
called the presumption that every man knows the 
law. But a more satisfactory explanation is, that, 
when men live in society, a certain average of con­
duct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going 
beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general 
welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and 
awkwar�, is always having accidents and hurting 
himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital 
defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, 
but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors 
than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neigh­
bors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to 
come up to their standard, and the courts which they 
establish decline to take his personal equation into 
account.31 
Century Tort Law, IH OHIO ST. L.J. •U�7 (1990). 
11 OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881). 
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Holmes recognized that there must be exceptions for children of 
tender years and for the physically handicapped. 32 These are 
blanket exceptions for liability but are based on the standard for 
reasonable behavior by a person with the particular disability. Thus 
a blind man who chose to drive a wagon through town would be 
liable for any injuries caused to bystanders, but a blind man who 
was injured because he did not dodge a run away horse could not be 
charged with contributory negligence. At least in the case of 
children, 33 early courts imputed the negligence of their caregivers to 
the child, finding that even if a child was not old enough to know to 
stay out of the road, the child would be charged with the negligence 
of his caregivers. 34 The courts also rejected an assumption of risk 
defense when persons were injured through dealings with persons 
known to be insane. 35 This is consistent with Holmes' view that the 
tort law must not be tailored to the individual circumstances of each 
defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to assume reasonable 
behavior from all persons. 
Holmes' view of insanity, which grew out of the traditional 
distinctions between fools, raging fools, and lunatics, recognized few 
Id. 
82 Id. at 109. 
A blind man is not required to see at his peril; and although he is, no 
doubt, bound to consider his infirmity in regulating his actions, yet if he 
properly finds himself in a certain situation, the neglect of precautions 
requiring eyesight would not prevent his reco vering for an injury to 
himself, and, it may be presumed, would not make him liable for injuring 
another. 
38 Since the early courts generally applied the same standards for children and the 
insane, it might be assumed that the courts would impute the negligence of their caregivers 
to an insane person as well: "There can be no distinction as to the liability of infants and 
lunatics, between torta of nonfeasance and of misfeasance,-between acts of pure negligence 
and act.a of trespass." Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449, 41H (N.Y. 1894). The court in Willi(Jms 
v. Hays gives an excellent review of the law at the time. See generally id. 
84 An infant is not sui juris. He belongs to another, to whom discretion in 
the care of his person is exclusively confided. That person is keeper and 
agent for this purpose; and in respect to third persons, his act must be 
deemed that of the infant; his neglect, the infant's neglect. Suppose a 
hopeless lunatic suffered to stray by his committee, lying in the road like 
a log, shall the traveler, whose sleigh unfortunately strikes him, be made 
amenable in damages? The neglect of the committee to whom his custody 
is confided shall be imputed to him. 
H
�
�o=���C::a!:r!:.nt.; ��\';9(��� Am. Dec. 273, 275·76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839). 
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nuances of mental impairment. What are now recognized as many 
varieties of mental illness, dementia, and mental retardation were 
lumped together and differentiated functionally as to their duration 
and whether they rendered the person significantly incapacitated 
within the context of nineteenth-century society. Holmes did 
recognize that while many insane persons might be able to carry out 
the tasks of life and should be charged with their torts, there are 
persons so incapacitated that they should be excused from liability. 36 
This is reflected in modern, specific intent cases which allow 
insanity as a defense and where the defendant's mental impairment 
prevents the manifestation of the requisite intent. 37 A variation of 
this defense is the sudden incapacitation defense, where the 
defendant is suddenly overcome by a mental or physical illness that 
prevents him from exercising due care. The sudden impairment 
defense is implicit in even the oldest cases in that the courts have 
Id. 
311 HOLMES, supra note 31, at 109. 
Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal with, and no general rule can 
be laid down about it. There is no doubt that in many cases a man may 
be insane, and yet perfectly capable of taking the precautions, and of being 
influenced by the motives, which the circumstances demand. But if 
insanity of a pronounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the 
sufferer from complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense 
would require it to be admitted as an excuse. 
37 This principle does not apply in torts that require a level of specific intent beyond the 
capacity of the defendant. See Wilson v. Walt, 25 P.2d 343 (Kan. 1933) (upholding jury verdict 
for defendant in slander case and finding that it was proper to allow jury to determine if 
defendant's insanity impaired his ability to manifest necessary intent to defame plaintiff); 
Becker v. Becker, 138 N.Y.S.2d 397, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (finding that defendant could 
not form necessary intent to defraud and stating that it "cannot agree that it [the law] applies 
to actions to recover for fraud where the essential elements include intention to defraud and 
deception .. .. An incompetent is incapable of deception."); see also Polmatier v. Russ, 537 
A.2d 468 (Conn. 1988) (holding defendant liable even though his actions were based on insane 
delusions and was not capable of necessary intent); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saboda, 
489 So. 2d 768, 770·71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The latter court noted: 
Obviously, a deranged person who cannot form a rational intent cannot be 
guilty of a wanton tort requiring a specific state of mind (actual or 
constructive malice)-the same "wanton negligence" required by the 
"firemen's rule." . . . The liability for compensatory damages of insane 
persons for their acts or omissions is based on public policy rather than 
traditional tort concepts of fault-but that liability does not extend to 
punitive damages, nor can it be extended to any tort requiring wanton 
misconduct. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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always recognized that defendants should not be liable if the injury 
was not of their making at all. In this sense the old cases do not 
stand for strict liability, but liability based on some voluntary 
action, even if the action was based on an insane delusion. The 
usual statement was that "[i]f the accident was attributable to a 
'superhuman, or irresistible cause,'-to an 'act of God,'-the 
defendant would not be liable; that as a general principle no man 
shall be responsible for that which no man can control. ... "38 The 
special circumstance of acts of God excusing behavior was funda­
mental to Anglo-American jurisprudence and was frequently at 
issue in early cases. 39 The general warranty of common carriers was 
excused, 40 as was the obligation of contracts, 41 and the usual strict 
liability for the escape of prisoners.42 The act of God exception was 
extended to persons who suffered sudden physical illnesses while 
operating trains43 and then to persons driving automobiles. 44 
31 Rodgers v. Central Pac. R. Co., 8 P. 377, 377 (Cal. 1885). See HOLMES, supra note 31, 
at 201·02 ("With regard to the act of God, it was a general principle, not peculiar to carriers 
nor to bailees, that a duty was discharged if an act of God made it impossible of perfor­
mance."). 
39 See, e.g., Holden v. Toye Bros. Auto and Taxicab Co., 1 La. App. 521, 1522·23 (La. Ct. 
App. 1925): 
An injury caused by the act of God or a superior agency without the fault 
of defendant will not impose any liability on him. An act of God is defined 
as inevitable accident without the intervention of man and the public 
enemy. To constitute an act of God in such sense as to relieve defendant 
from liability for injury it must have been so far outside the range of 
ordinary human experience that the duty of exercising ordinary care did 
not require it to be anticipated or provided against. 
(citations omitted). 
40 See Backhouse v. Sneed, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 173, 174 (1808) ("Whatever doubts formerly 
prevailed as to the extent of a carrier's responsibility, the law seems now to be well settled 
that he is liable for all lo88es except such as happen by the act of God or the enemies of the 
state."); Williams v. Grant, 1Conn. 487 (1816); Colt v. M'Mechen, 6 Johns. 160 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1810). 
41 See Harrington v. Dennie, 13 Mass. 92, 93 (1816) ("Now it is a common principle, that, 
when a man is bound to perform a contract, which becomes impossible by the act of God, or 
unlawful by statute, after the making of the contract, he is excused from the performance; 
and may plead such matter in excuse, when sued upon his contract."). 
42 See Clark v. Litchfield County, 1 Kirby 318, 319 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) ("That in every 
supposable case of an escape, the sheriff or county are liable, unless the escape was effected 
by inevitable accident, the public enemy, or the act of God."); Patten v. Halsted, 1 N.J.L. 320 
(1795). 
43 See Beiner v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 181 N.Y.S. 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920) (holding 
railroad not liable because of act of God). 
44 See Carroll v. Bouley, 156 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ma88. 19159) ("By the great weight of 
634 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:621 
B. MODERN DEVELOPMENI'S 
A survey of early civil cases involving insanity finds that most 
cases involve the capacity to contract, to make wills, and to engage 
in various business ventures. There are relatively few tort cases. 
This began to change with changing technology. Modern personal 
injury law is very much a creature of technology, and no technology 
more than the automobile. Mental impairment becomes a much 
more serious threat as the automobile puts a premium on quick 
thoughts and action, and increases the potential lethality of an 
accident by orders of magnitude as compared to a horse and wagon. 
Automobile accidents are the most common worry for persons with 
early Alzheimer's disease. Traditional tort law does not allow 
mental or physical impairment as a defense to liability for a 
negligent accident.46 If a driver's impairment prevents the driver 
from properly controlling the automobile, then the courts find that 
he/she should not be driving. The only exception to this rule is the 
sudden incapacitation doctrine, updated to the special problems of 
the automobile. 
The classic case of mental impairment as sudden incapacitation 
for an automobile driver is Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co. 46 
Erma Veith, the insured, ran into the back of plaintiff Phillip 
Breunig's car. At the time of the accident she was suffering from an 
"insane delusion. "47 Defendant insurer argued that Veith should not 
authority a sudden and unforeaeeable physical seizure rendering an operator unable to 
control hie motor vehicle cannot be t.ermed negligence."). 
411 Thie presumption of liability is eo strong that a court found a ward liable for injuries 
caused by hie property when it wae negligently maintained by hie conservator. Filip v. 
Gagne, 177 A.2d 509 (N.H. 1962) . 
.a 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wie. 1970). Wisconsin waa a direct action atat.e at the time and thua 
the insurance company waa a named party. This case is also precedent for the trial judge' a 
latitude in showing the jury hie displeasure with the defense. The judge believed that the 
insurance company should have paid up and not forced the nominal defendant to auffer 
through the trial. Id. For an earlier discussion of thia theory applied to physical illneae, aee 
Waters v. Pacific Coast Dairy, 131 P.2d IS88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). 
47 Breunig, 173 N.W.2d at 622. 
The psychiatrist testified Mrs. Veith told him ehe waa driving on a road 
when ehe believed that God waa taking ahold of the et.eering wheel and 
was directing her car. She aaw the truck coming and et.epped on the gae 
in order to become air-borne because ehe knew she could fly because 
Batman does it. To her surprise ehe waa not air-home before striking the 
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be liable because her psychiatric condition came upon her without 
warning, thus falling into the sudden incapacitation exception. 
Plaintiff argued that precedent did not recognize mental illness as 
a defense to a negligence claim. The court first analyzed plaintiffs 
claim that mental illness should not be an excuse, beginning with 
the policy reasons that the mentally incapacitated are subject to tort 
laws while not prosecuted for crimes related to their mental illness: 
(1) Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss 
it should be borne by the one who occasioned it; (2) to 
induce those interested in the estate of the insane 
person (if he has one) to restrain and control him; and 
(3) the fear an insanity defense would lead to false 
claims of insanity to avoid liability. 48 
The court accepted these uncritically, but then distinguished the 
instant case from prior precedent, which involved defendants with 
permanent insanity. The court found that w bile permanent insanity 
was not a defense to tort actions, the sudden onset of incapacitating 
insanity could be. 49 While not discussed explicitly by the court, it 
could be argued that sudden incapacitating insanity does not violate 
the general principles for holding the insane liable for their torts. 
First, since it comes suddenly and without warning, the defendant 
is innocent, in the sense that he or she continued the dangerous 
activity in good faith, rather than being seen as putting others at 
risk. Second, there is no legal authority to control a person before 
the onset of the mental illness, nor would this be accepted as a valid 
restriction. Third, at least in this case, the insanity was permanent 
and thus did not raise the issue of faking to avoid liability. 60 The 
Id. 
truck but after the impact she was flying. 
48 Id. at 624. 
�9 Id. The court relied on Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.W.2d 140 (Wia. 
1962), which involved an accident caused when the driver fell asleep at the wheel. Breunig, 
173 N.W
.2d at 623. The Theisen court rejected arguments that falling asleep at the wheel 
should be strict liability. Theisen, 1 18 N. W.2d at 144. Relying on previous cases involving 
epilepsy and other sudden illnesses, the court allowed defendant to put on evidence that hi8 
falling asleep was a sudden and uncontrollable event. Id. 
110 The incentive to fake is much higher in criminal cases, but the courts aeem able to 
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court allowed defendant to go forward with its expert testimony 
pertaining to the sudden onset of insanity as a defense and required 
plaintiff to rebut the defense. 61 While the court did allow the mental 
illness as a defense, it used the sudden physical illness model, which 
the plaintiff successfully rebutted by showing that Veith had some 
premonition of the illness. 62 
The California courts reviewed the applicability of the sudden 
incapacitation doctrine to mental impairment in Bashi v. Wodarz. 63 
Defendant Wodarz was involved in two automobile accidents in a 
short period of time. This case involved the second, brought by 
plaintiff Bashi. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that she suffered a sudden mental impairment and thus was not 
responsible as a matter of law. The trial court granted her motion 
and plaintiff appealed. Recognizing that California has a long 
history of accepting sudden physical illness as a defense to an 
automobile accident claim, the judge determined that no court in 
California bad yet ruled on the Bruenig situation of sudden mental 
impairment. 64 Unlike most states, California had codified the 
common law rule that the insane are responsible for their torts. 66 
The court further noted that when the law was revised, effective 
secure adequate expert testimony to continue using insanity as a defense. It is hard to say 
whether the Breunig court would have ruled the same way had the claim been for temporary 
inaanity. 
51 Breunig, 173 N.W.2d at 624. The court noted that while the expert's contradicted, it 
need not be accepted by the jury and the jury could have reasonably found that the defendant 
had forewarning. Id. 
111 Id. at 624-2ti. The jury awarded plaintiff$10,000, reduced by the court to $7,000. Id. 
at 627. The award was complicated by the accusations of judicial misconduct, manifested by 
the judge in the presence of the jury by a disapproval of the defense. Id. at 626. While the 
court found the judge's behavior within the bounds of judicial discretion, it could be expected 
that it had a significant influence on the jury. Id. 
Sll 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
114 Id. at 638-39 ("Under a line of appellate authorities beginning with Waters in 1942, 
these cases generally hold that a driver, suddenly stricken by an illness rendering the driver 
unconscious, is not chargeable with negligence."). The Bashi court cited many cases 
containing instances where a driver was not or may not have been chargeable with negligence 
due to some sudden occurrence rendering the driver unconscious. Bashi, IS3 Cal. Rpt. 2d at 
638. 
115 The court noted that Civil Code section 41, as originally enacted in 1872, provided: "A 
�or, or. perao� of u�und mind, of whatever degree, is civilly liable for a wrong done by him, but 18 not liable m exemplary damages unless at the time of the act he was capable of 
knowing that it was wrongful." Id. at 639. 
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January 1, 1994, the legislature removed minors from the law but 
left the rest substantially intact. 56 The court found this to be a 
significant statement of public policy, one that was bolstered by 
comments in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that indicate that 
the drafters did not believe that the sudden medical emergency 
doctrine extended to mental illness.157 Driven by these findings, the 
court rejected sudden mental impairment as a defense to a negli­
gence tort and reversed the summary judgment for the defendant. 
The most difficult question in sudden incapacitation cases, and, 
more generally, in Alzheimer's disease, is determining when the 
patient is on notice that he or she is sufficiently impaired that he or 
she should voluntarily restrict his or her activities. This is illus­
trated by Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 158 in which defendant driver 
requested sudden incapacitation instructions as a defense to 
plaintiffs claim that she negligently operated her automobile. 59 The 
trial court granted these instructions, which the plaintiff argued 
were defective because they did not require the jury to find that 
defendant was rendered unconscious. The appeals court agreed 
with defendant and remanded for a new trial because it found that 
the court's use of the terms "confusion" and "disorientation" was too 
vague. 60 The supreme court disagreed, finding that unconsciousness 
118 Id. 
57 Id. at 641. The court, citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C cmt. b 
(1965), discussed the onset of a "transit.ory delirium" as follows: 
Id. 
The same allowance (the reasonable man is identical with the act.or] is 
made for physical, as distinguished from mental, illne88. Thus a heart 
attack, or a temporary dizzinesa due t.o fever or nausea, as well as a 
transit.ory delirium, are regarded merely as circumstances t.o be taken int.o 
account in determining what the reasonable man would do . . . .  Although 
the respondent's sudden onset of mental illne88 might arguably be 
classified as a "transit.ory delirium" under the Restatement, such a 
clBBBification is unlikely given that the "transit.ory delirium" is discussed 
in the comment relating to physical, as opposed to mental, disabilities. 
(Since the Restatement makes a distinction between physical and mental 
disabilities, it is more like)y that the phrase "transit.ory delirium" used in 
the Restatement relates back to the previous phrase regarding the effects 
of fever. 
118 616 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1999). 
59 Id. at 146. The sudden incapacitation defense is referred to in this jurisdiction as the 
sudden medical emergency defense. 
90 Id. at 147. The court stated: 
638 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:62 1 
was too narrow a limit on the sudden incapacitation defense. The 
court directly addressed plaintiffs assertion that Alzheimer's 
disease could not form the basis of a sudden incapacitation defense 
and established the standard for using this defense in Alzheimer's 
disease cases:81 
Id. 
During the trial defendant presented three different 
medical explanations supporting the defense of 
sudden incapacitation: Alzheimer's disease, TIA,62 
and arrhythmia. This evidence went directly to the 
elements of sudden incapacitation. The testimony of 
defendant's two witnesses, both qualified as medical 
experts, in substantiation of her affirmative defense 
was neither objected to nor controverted by plaintiff. 
For example, defendant presented evidence that she 
had not previously been diagnosed with and had 
never before experienced any of the three possible 
medical conditions which tended to show the second 
element of the affirmative defense, namely whether 
the incapacitation was foreseeable. Therefore, the 
trial court properly submitted to the jury the issue of 
whether defendant suffered a sudden, unforeseen 
incapacitation which caused her to lose control of her 
vehicle and caused the accident.63 
Practical considerations also support a requirement of loss of conscious­
neu aa an element of the sudden medical incapacitation defense. 
"Confusion" and "disorientation" are somewhat vague, imprecise, and 
subjective terms. They present the potential to foster fraud and abuse of 
the sudden medical incapacitation defense. ''Unconsciousness" is a 
workable, objective test that is more easily understood and applied to 
meuure sudden medical incapacitation. 
" Id. at 149 \PlaintifJ argues that submitting that defense improperly extends the 
sudden·incapacitation defense to mental illnesses and deficiencies which do not excuse 
negligence; plaintiff further argues that Alzheimer's disease does not cause unconsciousness and that its effects are not unforeseen or sudden."). 
. a A �a�ient iachemic attack is a temporary clouding of consciousness caused by an 
mterruption m blood flow to the brain. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1840 
(29th ed. 2000). 
11 Word v. Jones ez rel. Moore, 516 S.E.2d 144, 149 (N.C. 1999). 
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While this case shows that Alzheimer's disease is not a complete bar 
to the use of the s udden incapacitation defense, at least in jurisdic­
tions that do not require a showing of unconsciousness, it also 
indicates that had she had a prior diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease, 
however mild, it is unlikely that she would be able to prove that her 
sudden incapacitation was unforeseeable. If it was foreseeable, then 
plaintiff will be able to argue that defendant was negligent in 
driving at all, beyond the specific negligence that led to the accident, 
and may be able to get a punitive damages instruction based on 
defendant's behavior in knowingly subjecting plaintiff and others to 
the risk that she would not be able to control her car. Strategically, 
this will be a very powerful argument because of the combination of 
the progression of Alzheimer's disease and time it takes to get to 
trial. Whatever the defendant's condition at the time of the 
accident, the jury is likely to see a severely demented defendant on 
the stand. Unless the defendant's condition at the time of the 
accident was fully documented in a way that will be admissible to 
the court, defendant will find it very hard to convince the jury that 
she was justified in driving after a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease. 
C. CLAIMS BY INJURED CAREGIVERS 
Some PWDs are combative and dangerous to those around them 
when they get confused or disoriented, and some become consis­
tently Violent. This takes a great toll on caregivers and raises issues 
of spousal abuse as well as potential tort and criminal liability. 
Developing a model for legal responsibility to caregivers must 
address the problems of both professional and informal caregivers. 
The reported cases deal only with professional caregivers. 
IV. PROFESSIONAL CAREGIVERS 
The older cases, typified by McGuire v. Almy,64 analyze the case 
from the traditional frame of reference that the insane are liable for 
intentional torts as  long as they can form the requisite intent to act. 
Critically, the courts did not accept as a· defense that the action was 
.. 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937). 
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based on an insane delusion.65 In Almy, the plaintiff was a nurse 
assigned to twenty-four-hour duty caring for defendant. Defendant 
was locked in her room unless accompanied by plaintiff or other 
caregivers, and had threatened plaintiff in the past. At the time of 
the injury, defendant was in a rage in her room, having broken up 
her furniture. When plaintiff entered the room, she saw defendant 
brandishing the leg ofa low-boy.66 Plaintiff called for help and when 
it arrived they attempted to subdue defendant. In the process, 
defendant clubbe d  plaintiff, causing serious head injuries. Since the 
jury found that defendant had the requisite intent, the court 
reviewed defendant's argument that plaintiff had assumed the risk 
of caring for defendant and was on notice of the danger defendant 
posed. 
The court rejected this assumption of risk defense, finding that 
prior to the incident in question, defendant had not manifested 
dangerous propensities. 67 Finding the defendant brandishing the 
furniture leg as a club did put the plaintiff on notice of the danger, 
but the court found that by that time there was an emergency and 
it was within plaintiffs duty to try to help defendant. Understand­
ably, the court was unwilling to create a rule that would discourage 
caregivers from helping the insane if they might be at personal 
risk. 68 This analysis is consistent with the policy that employees do 
Id. 
66 Id. at 763. 
This means that in so far as a particular intent would be necessary in 
order to render a normal person liable, the insane person, in order to be 
liable, must have been capable of entertaining that same intent and must 
have entertained it in fact. But the law will not inquire further into his 
peculiar mental condition with a view to excusing him ifit should appear 
that delusion or other consequence of his aftliction has caused him to 
entertain that intent or that a normal person would not have entertained 
it. 
66 Id. at 761. 
61 Id. at 763 r'Aithough the plaintiff knew when she was employed that the defendant 
was a mental case, and despite some show of hostility and some violent and unruly conduct, 
there was no evidence of any previous attack or even of any serious threat against anyone."). 
68 Id. at 763-64. 
The plaintiff had assumed the duty of caring for the defendant. We think 
that a reasonable attempt on her part to perform that duty under the 
peculiar circumstances brought about by the defendant's own act did not 
necessarily indicate a voluntary consent to be injured. Consent does not 
always follow from the intentional incurring of risk. "The degree of 
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not assume the risk of the workplace. 89 It contradicts one of the key 
policy justifications for holding the insane liable for their torts: that 
such liability will encourage those responsible for the insane person 
to ensure that those under their care are confined as necessary to 
protect the public. If the caregivers who have been hired to protect 
the patient and prevent the patient from being a threat to others 
can also sue the patient, then the relatives may have less incentive 
to protect the family assets by confining the patient. If the insane 
person is under care, it may also result in demands that the patients 
be restrained or otherwise restricted to prevent harm to nursing 
home personnel. This would make it more difficult to ensure 
humane care of the patient. 
V. FIREFIGHTER'S RULE CASES 
The court in Anicet v. Gant, 70 considering the case of an involun­
tarily committed patient who could not control his actions, recog­
nized that finding an insane person liable for intentional torts 
because he acted voluntarily, even if deluded, was a pretext for 
liability driven by public policy and not by traditional notions of 
responsibility for one's own actions.71 The court distinguished the 
plaintiff caregiver from the innocent member of the general public 
who is contemplated in the policy of compensating the innocent. 
danger, the stress of circumstances, the expectation or hope that others 
will fully perform the duties resting on them, may all have to be consid· 
ered." 
Id. (quoting Miner v. Conn. River R.R., 26 NE 994, 995 (Mass. 1891)). 
89 But see Van Vooren v. Cook, 75 N.Y.S.2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) (indicating that 
notice of defendant's dangerousness might preclude suit by long-term employees who knew 
him well). 
10 580 So.2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
71 Id. at 275. 
Instead, the conclusion that liability exists ia rounded squarely and 
acknowledgedly upon principles of good public policy which, it is held, are 
furthered by that conclusion. Almost invariably these considerations are 
stated to be: 
(1) the notion that as between an innocent injured person and an 
incompetent injuring one, the latt.er should bear the 1088; and 
(2) the view that the imposition of liability would encourage the utmost 
restriction of the insane person so that he may cause no unneceasary 
damage to the innocent. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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Instead, the court analogized to the firefighter's rule which contem­
plates that confronting risk is inherent in some professions. The 
risk of injury is internalized in the pay and benefits of the profession 
and in return the professional gives up the right to sue third parties 
when the risk occurs. Without such restrictions, the general public 
might be reticent to call firefighters and other emergency workers 
for fear of liability. The court held that the same rationale should 
govern institutional caregiver cases. To rule otherwise could 
encourage institutions to limit personal contact with patients in 
favor of restraints and drastically curtailed liberty. The court also 
rejected the rationale that such liability would encourage families 
to better protect the public from the insane because the family and 
the defendant had already done everything they could to protect the 
public. 
It is tempting to analogize institutional caregivers to public 
safety personnel, thus resolving the liability problem with the 
firefighter's rule.72 Herrle v. Estate of Marshall13 generalized the 
concept behind the firefighter's rule through the doctrines of 
primary versus secondary assumption of risk, applying it to the 
nursing home caregiver situation. 74 The archetypical case of 
primary assumption of risk is participation in sports events. An 
informal touch football game led to California's explication of these 
72 See Gould v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996). 
73 53 Cal Rptr. 2d 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
74 When California adopted the doctrine of comparative fault, assumption of risk became 
a critical issue because it became the only action by the plaintiff that could continue to defeat 
his claim. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). This situation forced the 
California courts to sort out the conflicting usage of assumption of risk in past cases: 
A3 for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this 
defense overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent and in fact 
is made up of at least two distinct defenses. "To simplify greatly, it has 
been observed . . .  that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff 
unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by 
a defendant's negligence, plaintiffs conduct, although be may encounter 
that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory 
negligence . . . . Other kinds of situations within the doctrine of assump­
tion of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held to agree to 
relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him. Such 
a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a 
reduction of defendant's duty of care." 
Id. at 1240 (quoting Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 418 P.2d 153, 156 (Cal. 1966)). 
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doctrines in Knight v. Jewett. 715 Primary assumption of risk occurs 
when plaintiff engages in an activity that generally involves known 
risks, while secondary assumption of risk deals with situations 
where the plaintiff knowingly encounters risks specific to the facts 
of the case at issue. Primary assumption of risk results in no duty 
on the defendant to prevent or mitigate those risks, and that 
defendant does not need to show that the risks were known to the 
plaintiff personally. This distinction is important because it is much 
more difficult for a plaintiff to prove or show facts which raise a jury 
question in a primary assumption of risk case. 76 
Herrle is a key case because it involves a patient with Alzheimer's 
disease who was confined in a nursing home. 77 She had a history of 
being combative and belligerent: "The admitting diagnosis indicated 
'She can be very combative at times.' Likewise, the nursing 
assessment indicated, ' . . .  becomes very belligerent at times. High 
risk for injury.' "78 The plaintiff was injured when she attempted to 
prevent the defendant from falling when being moved from a chair 
to the bed and the defendant struck her in the head, causing serious 
injuries. 79 In a traditional assumption of risk-now denominated 
secondary assumption of risk-case, defendant would have to prove 
that the plaintiff knew of the risks and unreasonably encountered 
them, i.e., that the emergency defense from McGuire v. Almy does 
not apply. However, defendant can claim primary assumption of 
risk through a general showing that nurses are trained to recognize 
and manage such violence, that patients with the defendant's · 
Id. 
75 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
78 Id. at 703-04. 
Although the ditference between the "primary assumption of risk" 
"secondary assumption of risk" nomenclature and the "reasonable implied 
asaumption of risk" "unreasonable implied aasumption of risk" terminol· 
ogy embraced in many of the recent Court of Appeal decisions may appear 
at first blush to be only semantic, the significance extends beyond mere 
rhetoric. First, in "primary auumption of risk" cues-where the 
defendant owes no duty t.o protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of 
harm-a plaintift' who has suffered such harm is not entitled to recover 
from the defe ndant, whether the plaintiffs conduct in undertaking the 
activity was reasonable or unreasonable. 
11 He"le, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715. 
" Id. 
7t Id. 
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condition are prone to violence, and that a nurse working in the 
institution where defendant was housed would have been aware of 
the nature of the patient population, even if she were unaware of 
the specific proclivities of defendant. Having found that the 
defendant made this showing, the court found that the defendant 
did not owe the plaintiff any duty of care and thus could not be 
liable for her actions toward the plaintiff. 80 
The dissent in Herrle raises difficult issues in the factual 
application of primary assumption of risk to plaintiffs circum· 
stances. The firefi.ghter's rule is predicated on the job role of a 
professional public safety worker who is trained to encounter the 
specific risks of the profession, and, most importantly, is explicitly 
compensated for encountering negligent and even intentional risks: 
Probably most fires are attributable to negligence, 
and in the final analysis the policy decision is that it 
would be too burdensome to charge all who carelessly 
cause or fail to prevent fires with the injuries suffered 
by the expert retained with public funds to deal with 
those inevitable, although negligently created, occur­
rences. Hence, for that risk, the fireman should 
receive appropriate compensation from the public he 
serves, both in pay which reflects the hazard and in 
workmen's compensation benefits for the conse­
quences of the inherent risks of the calling. 81 
In most jurisdictions, firefighters and police have separate disabil­
ity, pension, and worker's compensation benefits than other 
municipal workers. These are very generous, both in benefits paid 
and in the criteria for qualifying for those benefits. 82 In contrast, 
80 See id. at 714-US (concluding that "primary assumption of the risk doctrine bars 
recovery under these circumstances and [we] therefore affirm the trial court's judgment."). 11 Krauth v. Geller, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1960). . 
12 California's courts have described the fireman benefits as: 
First, they receive special presumptions of industrial causation as to 
certain disabilities. Second, special death benefits apply to public safety 
officers if they are under the Public Employees Retirement System. 
Third, if under that system or the County Employees Retirement Law of 
1937, they are entitled to an optional leave of absence for up to one year 
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many nursing home personnel, such as the plaintiff in Herrle, 83 are 
minimally trained paramedical positions such as nurses aides. 
These positions are poorly paid, often have limited benefits, 84 and 
carry few expectations of continued employment. Rather than being 
trained and hired to deal with violent patients, they are hired to do 
low level nursing care and come into contact with such patients 
through inadvertence or, as in Herrle, while trying to help prevent 
injury to a patient in an emergency. In Herrle, the plaintiffs 
injuries cost more than $200,000 and it is not clear how much of 
those were covered by worker's compensation. 85 It is hard to justify 
a claim that such caregivers with their marginal benefits and 
limited job security are paid to encounter the risks of their employ­
ment in the same as professional public safety workers. Since even 
the firefighter's rule has exceptions for risks beyond those contem­
plated in going to a fire, 86 the dissent argues that it is unjust to hold 
that every employee of a nursing home has assumed the risks of 
being battered by a patient. 
More critically, the courts justify the firefighter's exception on the 
special nature of the public safety employment. 87 The courts have 
with full pay. Fourth, their permanent disability benefits are fully payable 
despite retirement, and are not reduced by disability pensions even when 
both are paid for the same injury. 
Baker v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (Cal. App. 1982) (citations omitted). 
13 Herrle, 153 Cal. Rptr.2d at 713. 
84 In some circumstances they are contract or agency workers who have no benefits at 
all. 
16 Clearly some coats were covered because the compensation carrier intervened in the 
case t.o recoup its payments. Herrle, 153 Cal. Rptr.2d at 713. 
18 Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 3152, (Cal. 1994). 
Id. 
The firefighter'& rule, however, is hedged about with exceptions. The 
firefighter does not assume every risk of his or her occupation. The rule 
does not apply t.o conduct other than that which necessitated the 
summoning of the firefighter or police officer, and it does not apply to 
independent acts of misconduct that are committed after the firefighter 
or police officer baa arrived on the ecene. 
87 Id. at 31515. 
When the firefighter is publicly employed, the public, having secured the 
services of the firefighter by taxing itself, etande in the shoes of the person 
who hires a contract.or to cure a dangerous condition. In effect, the public 
baa purchased exoneration from the duty of care and should not have t.o 
pay twice, through taxation and through individual liability, fur that 
service. 
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held that these factors are not present in private employment, even 
of safety personnel, 88 which makes it questionable whether these 
factors should be found in the employment of nursing home 
personnel. The majority opinion meets these objections by returning 
to Neighbarger and arguing that the key point was not the pub­
lic/private dichotomy, but whether the defen.dant had contracted for 
the plaintiffs services. Thus, the taxpayers contract for fire services 
and the nursing home resident contracts for care, each with its 
attendant risks to the provider, while the defendant in Neighbarger 
was a third party with no agreements with the plaintiff. 89 While the 
court focuses on assumption of risk, it is more useful to look at the 
problem from the perspective of the caregiver. The caregiver does 
not assume the risk of injury in the sense that the old cases found 
that employees assumed the risk of injuries and thus were estopped 
from suing for compensation. Instead, caregivers accept that their 
compensation will be limited to that available through worker's 
compensation. Thus the nursing home residents, or others on their 
behalf, shift the burden of compensating workers injured by their 
actions to the employer through contracting for care. This is a more 
meaningful analysis because primary and secondary assumption of 
risk are about losing the right to compensation, rather than the 
Id. 
Id. 
118 Id. at 357. 
The moat substantial justifications for the firefighter's rule are those 
based on the public nature of the service provided by firefighters and the 
relationship between the public and the public firefighter. Fire fighting 
is essentially a government function, and the public has undertaken the 
financial burden of providing it without liability to individuals who need 
it. Because of the relationship between the public, the firefighter, and 
those who require the services of the firefighter, the individual's usual 
duty of care towards the firefighter is replaced by the individual's 
contribution to tax-supported compensation for the firefighter. This 
relationship is missing between a privately employed safety employee and 
a third party. 
89 Id. at 355 ("Having no relationship with the employee, and not having contracted for 
his or her services, it would not be unfair to charge the third party with the usual duty of care 
towards the private safety employee.j. This rationale clearly does not apply here. 
Defendant, through her relatives, did contract, seek, and need the services of plaintiff. 
Defendant, through these same relatives, paid to be relieved of a duty of care. Defendant had 
a rel�tionship of care receiver and caregiver with plaintiff. Therefore, it would be unfair to 
now unpose on defendant the very duty of care that she had contracted for plaintiff to supply. 
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contractual reallocation of the method and form of compensation. 
More importantly, it obviates the need to assess the competence of 
the patient90 and it removes the patient as a party to the litigation. 
VI. INFORMAL CAREGIVERS 
Most PWDs are cared for by family members or significant 
others, outside formal institutions. They are subject to the same 
abusive behavior as the institutional caregivers, but seldom have 
the training or resources to manage it as effectively as do the 
institutions. Their only resort in severe cases is to call the police or 
emergency medical personnel. They are not covered by worker's 
compensation and may not even have health insurance. If the 
person they are caring for has some type of personal liability 
insurance, they could sue under the same theories as other tort 
claimants. While the insurance company might argue assumption 
of risk, it is not supported by any of the policy rationales developed 
in the professional caregiver cases. In the absence of insurance, 
they are exposed to the risk of injury with little hope of compensa­
tion. To the extent that this makes it difficult to care for their 
family member, the state might, as a matter of public policy, extend 
some type of disability and health insurance coverage to informal 
caregivers, recognizing the benefit of their services to the PWD and 
as a cost-saving measure for the state. 
When informal caregivers call the police, or when emergency 
medical personnel find an injured caregiver and call the police as 
required by various spousal abuse laws, the caregiver is confronted 
with the problem of the police arresting the PWD, which is usually 
what they want. If the police do arrest the abuser, which they are 
obligated to do under some spousal abuse laws, they do not have 
proper facilities to hold and care for a PWD. These situations 
demand a system that can protect both the caregiver and the PWD. 
One system would use twenty-four hour care centers where a PWD 
can be taken by the police or emergency medical personnel, and the 
90 Assuming that the patient ia impaired to some degree. Thia doctrine should not shelter 
attacks made with criminal intent, unrelated to impairment. Thus, mere housing at a 
nursing home should not convey blanket immunity for torts. 
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caregiver has the right to use such personnel vehicles for emergency 
transport. Any such system requires rethinking domestic violence 
laws so they recognize that the caregiver is not served by a system 
that criminalizes the dangerous behavior, thus discouraging the 
caregiver from calling for help in all but the most extreme situa­
tions. 
A. CAREGIVER LIABIIJTY 
The legal issues and public policy concerns are very different for 
professional and informal caregivers. Informal caregivers are 
usually family members who volunteer their services with limited 
community support. Professional caregivers are usually state 
regulated and often paid through state and federal funds, as well as 
private insurance. From a public safety perspective, it is arguable 
that both should have a duty to protect their charges from injury 
and to protect the general public from injury caused by PWDs under 
their control. However, such liability comes with a significant price 
in insurance costs, risks to assets, and resources that might better 
be used for caring for the PWDs. The courts have responded to 
these differing policy concerns with very different liability regimes 
for informal and professional caregivers. 
VII. PROFESSIONAL CAREGIVERS 
Professional caregivers, especially total care facilities, assume the 
duty to protect the patient and their liability is governed by the 
same precedent as that of health-care providers in general. They 
are liable for injuries to the PWD caused by substandard care, which 
will be measured by expert testimony and the use of professional 
standards documents. They will be liable for injuries to third 
parties to the extent that they either owe a specific duty to the third 
party91 or when they undertake a general duty of care that includes 
81 The most common example ia the duty t.o prevent one patient from injuring another. 
These cases usually turn on whether the caregiver had notice of the patient's dangerous 
tendencies, although it can be argued that PWDs always pose some risk t.o others through 
inadvertence. See, e.g., Bradley Center, Inc. v. Weaaner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982) (involving 
patient who kills wife while on leave); Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp. of Minneapolis, 53 
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preventing harm to others. There is little precedent directly on 
point for nursing homes and controlled living centers caring for 
PWDs. Most cases deal with the question of whether a mental 
institution properly released an insane person who then committed 
a murder or other intentional tort. These divide into the Tarasoff" 
line of failure to warn cases and the pure negligent discharge or 
supervision cases. 93 Even in these cases the courts are reluctant to 
find liability without very specific evidence of dangerousness, 
sometimes including the identification of the specific victim. 94 
The best analysis is in Garrison Retirement Home Corp. v. 
Hancock,9r. which deals with whether a controlled living center had 
the duty to prevent a PWD (probably Alzheimer's disease)96 from 
driving his car. 97 Plaintiff was a contractor's employee investigating 
N. W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952) (involving patient injured by another patient who waa viaibly drunk); 
Roettger v. United Hoap. of St. Paul, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (involving 
patient injured by intruder); Freeman v. St. Clare'• Hoap. &: Health Ctr., 648 N.Y.S.2d 686 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (involving patient raped while in reatrainta); Delk v. Columbia/HCA 
/Healthcare Corp., 523 S.E.2d 826 CVa. 2000) (involving patienteexually uaaulted by another 
patient). For a general review, eee N. Jean Schendel, Potienta °' V'u:tim.-Hoapilal Liability 
for Third-Party Crime, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 419 (1993); Adam A. Milani, �nt Alloulta: 
Health Care Provuurs Owe a Non-DekllObk DUly to '!'Mr Potienta and Should be Held 
Strictly Liabk for Employee Aataulta Whether or Not Within tM Seo,,. of Employment, 21 
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1 147 (1995); Gregory G. Sarno, Phy1ician'1 Failure to ProucC Third Porty 
from Harm by Nonpychiatric Patient, 43 AM. JUR. PROOF or FACl'S 2D Play1ician 'I Duty 657 
(1985). 
12 Taraaofrv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1529 P.2d 1553 (Cal. 1974). • See, e.g., Lacock v. United States, No. 915-315778, 1997 WL 22263 (9th Cir. Jan. 115, 
1997); White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Semler v. P1yehiatric Inat. of 
Waahington, D.C., 1538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1976); Hick1 v. United State•, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C. 
Cir. 19715); Underwood v. United State1, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966); Fair v. United Statea, 
234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956); Panella v. United Stat.ea, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954); Williama 
v. United State1, 450 F. Supp. U>-40 (D.S.D. 1978); Smart v. United Stat.ea, 1 1 1  F. Supp. 907 
(D. Okla. 19153); Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (D. Aluka 1949); Baldwin v. 
Hoapital Auth. of Fulton County, S83 S.E.2d 1154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Eatate of Johnaon v. 
Condell Memorial Hoap., 520 N.E.2d 37 (Ill. 1988); Allentown State Hoep. v. Gill, 488 A.2d 
1211 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985). 
N Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 730 (Cal. 1980); Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. 
Weaaner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 694 (Ga. 1982). • Garrieon Ret. Home Corp. v. Hancock, 484 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Di.at. Ct. App. 19815). • Thia case illustrate• the problem of eatabliahin1 mental statue at the time of an 
accident. There wu no record of the patient'• mental statua until eeveral montha after the 
accident. Id. at 12159. 
" Id. Thia caae ia eapecially important becauae it ii one of the few that deal with 
negligent injuries caused by a PWD. Most c:uea involve intentional torte and murder by an 
inaane patient. &e, e.g., Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Weaaner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1983) (involvin1 
murder of wife by insane patient). 
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a roof leak at a retirement home who was injured when the patient 
drove his car into plaintiff while plaintiff was standing by his truck. 
Plaintiff sued the home, arguing that it was negligent in its duty to 
prevent the patient from driving. The court analyzed the case in 
terms of Section 3 15, Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third 
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm 
to another unless: 
(a) A special relation exists between the actor and 
the third person which imposes a duty upon the 
actor to control the third person's conduct, or 
(b) A special relation exists between the actor and 
the other which gives to the other a right to protec­
tion. 98 
The court recognized that the key element, which also runs through 
the informal caregiver cases, is whether the defendant had the right 
and the ability to control the actions of the person under their 
control. Defendant had taken significant measures to prevent the 
patient from driving, which the patient evaded with remarkable 
ingenuity.911 The court found that these evidenced defendant's 
ability to control the patient.100 Based on this ability to control and 
the failure of the defendant to control, the court found a duty to the 
88 Garrison Ret. HoTM, 484 So. 2d at 1261. 
98 Id. at 1239 ("[T]he retirement home personnel attempted to immobilize the car by 
letting air out of the tires, removing the battery cable, barricading it with Jane Rush's car and 
confiscating Tom's keys. However, Tom obtained a second set of keys and always managed 
to get the car back into operational condition."). 
'00 Id. at 1262. Interestingly, defendant may not have had the legal right to interfere with 
the patient's car: 
Jane Rush, the administrator of the retirement home, became concerned 
about Tom Egan's potential use of the automobile. Both the car's license 
tag and Tom's driver's license had expired. Consequently, Jane Rush 
inquired of her licensing authority, the Department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), regarding rules or regulations prohibiting 
Tom's use or ownership of his automobile while he resided at the 
retirement home. She was informed by Betty Gunter, DHRS adminiatra· 
tor, that under DHRS rules and regulations, she had no right to prevent 
Tom's use of his car, or prevent him from leaving the facility. 
Id. at 1239. 
2001] PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 651 
plaintiff. 101 It is difficult to generalize from this decision because of, 
as the court described them, the "peculiar facts": 
Granted the duty of a retirement home to its resi­
dents is not the same as that imposed upon the 
operator of an insane asylum or a hospital facility. 
Nevertheless, the evidence revealed that most of the 
Garrison residents were senile. The gates were kept 
locked for the protection of the residents who were 
not able to take care of themselves if they got outside. 
Some of the people, including Egan, had physical 
infirmities.  Tom could not walk without aid; he 
refused a walker but used two canes. He had periods 
of "rage reaction" and hallucinatory periods. Accord­
ing to Rush, the administrator of the home, Egan's 
driver's license and car tag had expired. He needed 
a pillow to see over the steering wheel and Rush 
testified that she believed him to be a dangerous 
person behind the wheel of a car. The people in 
charge of the Home were so concerned about Egan's 
driving that they resorted to taking his keys, discon­
necting his battery, flattening his tires, and finally 
blockading the car so it could not be moved. 102 
The court may be saying that a controlled living home obviously has 
a duty to control such a badly impaired patient who tries to drive. 
This is a logical inference, but the opinion can also be read as 
acknowledging the principle that defendant caregivers must carry 
out assumed duties non-negligently, but that there is no general 
duty to prevent p atients from driving. The court states that while 
the regulatory rules do not give the home the right to restrict the 
patient, they also provide that patients that endanger others are not 
101 Id. at 1262. The court found that a group home for tranaients and ex-convicts did not 
have the power to control its residents and thus was not liable for their crimes. The court 
justified this as a nece88ary rule to allow non-governmental charity organizations to operate 
such homes as a service to the residents and the state. Lighthouse Mission of Orlando, Inc. 
v. Estate of McGowen, 683 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
102 Garrison Ret. Home, 484 So. 2d at 1262. 
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permitted to stay in such homes. 103 Thus the court implies that 
defendant had a duty to act, but that this duty might have been 
satisfied by moving the patient to a more secure facility. 
The case leaves open the question of whether, in the absence of 
a regulation preventing such patients from residing in the home, the 
home could have avoided liability to plaintiff if it had not assumed 
the duty to prevent the patient from driving. Mitigating against 
this interpretation is the duty to protect the residents themselves. 104 
This home, and most like it, have locked grounds to prevent patients 
from injuring themselves by wandering away. Such precautions 
clearly indicate the assumption of a duty to protect the patients 
from inadvertent injuries related to sojourns off the grounds. 105 If 
such patients are at risk from walking, they are clearly at greater 
risk from driving, and the home would clearly have a duty to 
prevent them from driving. While the duty to the patient does not 
automatically inure to the benefit of a third party, public policy 
supports merging the duty to the patient and the duty to society 
because they are mutually reinforcing. 
VIII. INFORMAL CAREGIVERS 
With the demise of interfamilial tort immunity, there are no legal 
bars to persons suing their informal caregivers for torts related to 
Id. 
108 !cl. 
Aa mentioned previously, one of the HRS rules provides that a resident 
who manifests behavior destructive of property, to himself or others 
should not be allowed to remain in the Home. Another prohibited 
residents from bringing unsafe equipment on the premises. The 
administrator suggested to Dr. Garrison that he get rid of Tom, but he 
declined becauae, according to the administrator, the facility was not filled 
and they needed Tom and hi.a money. On this record, it appears t.o us that 
Garrison owed a duty to Egan, to Hancock, and others to prevent Egan 
from operating hi.a car in view of the knowledge it had regarding hi.a 
driving capabilities. 
1°' The classic line of cases involves patients who commit suicide while in mental or 
general medicine facilities. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Lenaink, 669 A.2d 618 (Conn. 1990); 
Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., 372 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) Muse v. Charter Hosp. of 
Winston-Salem, �2 S.E.2d IS89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861 (Va. 
1992). 
'06 For a cue involving liability for allowing minors to wander from a facility and injure 
a third party, see Nova Univ. v. Wagner, 491 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1986). 
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their care. 106 Given the dependence and impairment of most of the 
PWDs in the care of their families, they are unlikely to bring such 
suits on their own. It is more likely that suits would be brought by 
legal representatives of their estates, either court-appointed or other 
relatives. The major legal issues in such claims would be establish· 
ing the standard of care for an informal caregiver and the extent to 
which an informal caregiver has the ability or even the legal 
authority to prevent the PWD from driving or engaging in other 
risky activities. There do not appear to be any reported cases using 
these theories, but it may be that they are masked because they are 
brought as spousal abuse cases or other tort claims that do not 
involve caregiver issues. 
There are more cases involving liability to third parties. One of 
the rationales for holding the insane liable for their torts was that 
it would encourage their families to keep them confined so that they 
would not injure others. This was only an indirect incentive, in that 
it depended on the insane defendant having assets that the plaintiff 
could reach and that the family had an interest in protecting these 
assets. It might be expected that the courts would further this 
policy by holding the family members personally liable for the torts 
committed by persons under their care. In contrast to their rhetoric 
on encouraging the family to take responsibility, the courts have 
been very reluctant to find family caregivers directly liable for the 
torts committed by mentally impaired persons under their care. 
The case of Emery v. Littlejohn 107 is a good review of the law as 
of 1915 and illustrates the traditional view of third party liability for 
informal caregivers. Plaintiff was shot by defendants' adult son, 
whom the defendants were caring for after he had been released 
from a mental institution.  Plaintiff sued defendant parents for 
negligence in overseeing plaintiffs actions, based partly on an 
assumption of responsibility signed by defendants when they took 
108 For a recent review of the doctrine, see Herzfeld 11. Herzfeld, 732 So. 2d 1 102 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1999), reu. granted, 7 40 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1999). See also Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 
P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295 
N. W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S. W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991). But see Ascuitto 
v. Farricielli, 7 1 1  A.2d 708 (Conn. 1998). 
107 145 P. 423 (Wash. 1915). 
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the son home from the institution. 108 The court assumed that there 
was some general duty to the public, 109 but that this duty was 
defined by the extent that the son's violent actions were foreseeable, 
and that there was insufficient evidence that the son was 
homicidal. 110 In reviewing the law at the time, the court found: 
Id. 
The diligence of learned counsel for respondent has 
not brought to light a single decision of any court 
holding a person liable for negligence growing out of 
his want of care and restraint over an insane person. 
A remark made by the United States Court of Ap­
peals of the Eighth Circuit, seems quite appropriate 
here, where they say: 
"The absence of reported judgments and decisions 
sustaining an alleged liability under a given state of 
facts raises a strong presumption that no such liabil­
ity exists." 
We are not prepared to say that a private person 
having the legal custody and control of a violently 
insane person with homicidal tendencies could not, 
under any circumstances, be rendered liable for 
damages caused by such a person, resulting from 
want of proper restraint on the part of the person 
having him so in charge; yet no decision of a court 
involving even such an extreme case has been 
brought to our notice. m 
1• Id. at 424. 
This ia to certify that I have taken 0. W. Pence on parole from Western 
Hospital for 11188.ne. Knowing that he is not fully recovered, I assume all 
responsibility for his actions while in my charge, and agree to care for him 
and return him to the hospital at my own expense if it becomes nece88ary. 
'°' Id. at 427 ("The duty here involved, if any, was that of Littlejohn and wife to 
reapondent •imply 88 a member of the public."). 110 Id. at 428 C'We are of the opinion that it must be decided, as a matter of law, from the 
undiaputed facta here shown, that Littlejohn and wife were, as reasonable persons, not bound 
to anticipate the unfortunate occurrence upon which it is now sought to render them liable 
in damages."). 111 Id. at 428. 
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While a majority of subsequent cases reach the same conclusion, 1 12 
a number of courts have found exceptions when necessary to balance 
the community's interest in protection against the risk posed by 
persons under the control of informal caregivers. These cases are 
predicated on the personal negligence of the caregiver and the 
specific assumption of the duty to care for the relative. No modern 
courts find vicarious liability for adult family members, 1 13 nor do the 
courts find a legal duty to care for adult family members unless it 
is voluntarily assumed by the defendant. 114 While not specifically 
litigated in most cases, it is clear that there can only be liability if 
the informal caregiver can actually control the impaired person. 116 
The most important factor is whether the caregiver had notice of 
the impaired person's dangerousness. A leading case is Alva v. 
Cook, 116 which involved two sisters caring for their 62 year old 
mentally ill brother. He was a World War II veteran with a history 
of mental illness, but not of dangerous behavior. He kept a rifle 
112 See Hansra v. Superior Court, 9 Cal Rptr. 2d 216 (Cal Ct. App. 1992); Kaminski v. 
Town of Fairfield, 1578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990); Barmore v. Elmore, 403 N.E.2d 131515 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1980); Fisher v. Mutimer, 12 N.E.2d 3115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937). 111 For a good review ofstatus relationships and the duty to care for a family member, see 
Touchette 11. Ganal, 922 P.2d 347 (Hawaii 1996). For a discussion of the legal effect of a 
formal guardianship, see Sego 11. Mains, 1578 P.2d 1069 (Colo. Ct. APP· 1978). For an older 
case finding a husband liable for his wife's crazy behavior, see Burnett 11. Rushton, 52 So. 2d 
6415 (Fla. 19151). 
114 Plaintift'a in these cases must first show that defendants assumed the duty to act as 
caregiver. Thia ia illustrated by a series of cases det.ermining whether babysitters had a duty 
to care for children that they volunteered to care for, See Standifer v. Pate, 282 So. 2d 261 
(Ala. 1973); Barfield v. Langley, 432 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Whitney v. 
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2215 So. 2d 30 (La. Ct. APP· 1969). 
111 Carmona v. Padilla, 163 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 19157). 
Appellant's liability does not depend solely on her status as the grand· 
mother of the boy who shot the arrow that caused the infant plaintift's 
injury, nor on her status as co-owner of the property on which the incident 
occurred. . . . Perhaps her duty to supervise her grandson was not, as an 
isolated responsibility, as extensive as that of a parent-a duty probably 
related to the powers that parents posse88 to restrain their children's 
conduct. . . . However, the position the grandmother occupied in the 
house and household where the accident occurred gave her much greater 
authority to restrain her grandchild than would be enjoyed by a stranger; 
and in circumstances where strangers are endowed with relatively slight 
supervision for control over children they have been held to be under a 
duty to prevent injury by children to others. 
Id. See also Poncher v. Brackett, 515 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). 116 123 Cal. Rptr. 166 (Cal. Ct. APP· 1975). 
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and, without warning, shot plaintiff dead when plaintiff drove into 
defendant's driveway. Plaintiff alleged that defendants were 
negligent in allowing him to keep the rifle, have access to the rifle, 
and in not having him committed. The court found first that since 
California allowed the insane to possess firearms, it could not hold 
that the plaintiffs violated a legal duty in allowing their brother to 
keep his gun and have access to it. 117 Most critically, the court 
found, in unambiguous language that defendants' brother's insanity 
alone, without obvious dangerous behavior did not put defendants 
on notice that he should be committed or that they should restrict 
his actions: 
In the absence of ultimate facts that Malcolm was 
dangerous to himself and others at least sufficient to 
warrant a reasonable assumption that a petition for 
evaluation or commitment under the Lanterman­
Petris-Short Act would be granted, we are not ready 
to equate respondents' assumption of a moral obliga­
tion to a guarantee and indemnification agreement in 
respect of Malcolm's conduct on or off respondents' 
premises as if he were a dog and to hold that respon­
dents are their brother's keeper but at their risk.1 18 
While recognizing the importance of the policy stated in Alva to 
encourage families to care for their own, subsequent courts have 
recognized situations where plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to 
get to the jury on the issue of whether defendant had sufficient 
notice of dangerousness. 119 This is based on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 3 19.120 There is some question about whether 
117 The judge also commented that California allowed the insane to walk the streets: 
"Public policy of thia state allows one to walk the streets even if mentally ill and, in fact, there 
is nothing in the law which prevents the mentally ill from posse88ing firearms." Id. at 169 
(citationa omitted). 
111 Id. at 171. 
:: Mathes' Estate v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). 
RFsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1966) ("One who takes charge of a third 
person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not 
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent 
him from doing such harm.j. 
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just providing a home for a mentally ill and dangerous relative 
meets the standard of § 319: "Neither the defendant nor our own 
research has disclosed any case in which a parent, merely by 
making a home for an adult child who is a mental patient, has been 
held to be "[o]ne who takes charge of a third person" for the 
purposes of § 3 19."121 
The archetypical third party liability question for informal 
caregivers is whether they were negligent in allowing the PWD to 
drive a car. If the caregiver loans the demented person the care­
giver's car, then the case is simply one of traditional negligent 
entrustment.122 The more usual situation is that the PWD has 
his/her own car and the issue is whether, and to what extent, the 
caregiver has a duty to prevent the PWD from using the car. Irons 
v. Cole123 dealt with a legally similar problem: when does the family 
have a duty to restrict an adult child's access to guns? The court 
found the family liable for a murder committed by their son, based 
on their knowing that he had access to guns in their house and that 
he was mentally disturbed with a history of violence. Irons is 
predicated on premises liability, i.e., that the murder occurred on 
the premises, but the core issue is control of access to physical 
property rather than control of the son. 124 The court was careful to 
limit its decision to actions taken on the defendant's property, 
rather than finding a general duty to the community. Yet the 
court's analysis is based on general tort duties and is not tied to the 
traditional common law analysis of premises liability.125 It is a 
121 Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A2d 1048, 1052 (Conn. 1990). This case involved 
a counter claim against the parents by a police officer who was being sued for shooting the 
son after being called to the house to subdue him. The court indicated that calling the police 
to manage their son was clear evidence that plaintiffs were not able to control him. Id. 122 Frain v. State Farm Ins. Co., 421 So. 2d 1 169 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (involving entrustee 
who sued for her own injuries, alleging that defendant should have known not to lend car to 
plaintiff who was mental patient). · 1211 734 A2d 1052 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998). 
i:u Id. at 1054 ("This court specifically did not charge that the defendants had a duty 
arising from a relationship of control over their son . . . as the charge was based not on 
custodial control . . . but on a duty of care of the type . . . arising from control of the 
premises.") (citations omitted). 1211 Id. at 1054. 
We have stated that the test fur the existence of a legal duty of care 
entaila (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defen­
dant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, 
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small leap to extend it to accidents related to the use of a car off the 
premises of the caregiver when the access to the car was controlled 
on the premises, and the accident does not involve the intentional 
harmful conduct that makes courts very reluctant to extend liability 
beyond the immediate actor. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
Tort law must compensate injured individuals and deter 
dangerous behavior, while not discouraging desirable behavior. In 
general, the courts hold PWDs liable for their torts. While some 
scholars have argued that the mentally impaired should not be 
liable for their torts, 126 this position leads to the demand for a police 
power regime that confines or otherwise controls the risky behavior 
of the mentally impaired outside of the tort system. This is an 
unjustifiable denial of the autonomy of PWDs who can still function, 
at some level, in the larger world. While the rule that PWDs are 
liable for their torts is generally workable, it has unintended 
consequences when applied in the professional care setting. When 
the patient has either been confined or sought care precisely because 
he or she can no longer care for him/herself, it seems unjust to hold 
the patient liable when caregivers are injured. 
At the same time, the tort law is reticent to hold caregivers liable 
for the injuries that persons in their care inflict on others. There 
are two main exceptions: 1) when the caregiver is on notice of the 
dangerous propensities of his charge and has assumed control of the 
person's actions; and 2) when the caregiver assumes the duty by 
trying to prevent the dangerous activity, but fails. This rule and its 
exceptions provide insufficient incentive for informal caregivers to 
take steps to protect the public from PWDs, and it may actually 
would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that auft'ered was 
likely to reault, and (2) a determination, on the basia of a public policy 
analyaia, of whether the defendant's reaponaibility for ita negligent 
conduct should extend to the particular conaequencea or particular 
plaintiff in the caae. 
Id. (quoting Zamatein v. Marvaati, 692 A.2d 781, 786 (Conn. 1997)). 
•• For a review of theae theoriea, aee Sarah Light, Note, Rejecting the Logic of 
Con{iMmen.L· Can RelotioMhipa and the Mentally Diaabled Under Tort Low, 109 YALE L.J. 
381 (1999). 
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discourage such efforts because the courts may see these steps as 
creating a duty where one would not otherwise exist. A more 
rational policy would impose liability for inaction, but near-immu­
nity for caregivers who attempt to prevent injury but nonetheless 
fail. 
As other papers in this symposium have noted, PWDs pose very 
difficult legal planning and client counseling problems. In tort law, 
a central lawyering problem arises when the progression of a client's 
dementia between the occurrence of the tort and the subsequent 
litigation renders him unable to participate in his or her own 
defense. Courts should develop procedures to minimize the adverse 
impact of dementia on the defendant's case. Insurers, who are 
involved in accident cases long before litigation counsel, should 
develop legally admissible procedures to document the mental 
status and functional capacity of PWDs as soon after accidents as 
possible. This will help show the jury that the defendant at the time 
of the accident was competent, even where that competency 
evaporates by deposition and trial. 
One of the central problems with establishing policies for PWDs 
is the dearth of information about the relationship between 
dementia and risks to third parties for both negligent and inten­
tional torts. For example, it might be possible to develop driver 
recertification tests that would identify impaired drivers before they 
are grossly impaired. 127 And it might also be possible to determine 
if all drivers should be recertified more often after a certain age, or 
whether everyone over a certain age who has an accident should be 
evaluated for possible impairment. The objective of these measures 
would be to tailor the narrowest restrictions on PWDs that are 
consistent with public safety. But the state can develop only such 
measures if it systematically collects data on who has been diag­
nosed with conditions such as Alzheimer's disease and how their 
accident rates compare with the general public and with known risk 
groups such as teenage boys. Only through a combination of careful 
studies on the impact of Alzheimer's disease on individuals and 
society and the impact of tort law on PWDs and their caregivers can 
127 See, e.g. , David T. Levy et al., Relationship Between Driver's License Renewal Policies 
and Fatal Crashes Involving Drivers 70 Years or Older, 274 JAMA 1026 (1995). 
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the United States develop a humane and efficient tort policy that 
meets the needs of both PWDs and society. 
